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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
By ROBERT H. HALL*
The General Assembly of Georgia in its 1951 session enacted several
statutes dealing with municipalities and counties. The Municipal Home
Rule Law, which is certainly the most important enactment, is summarized
at the end of this paper. The cases and other statutes are discussed under
their customary topics.
TORTS

The immunity of municipal corporations from liability resulting from
governmental duties in contrast to its liability for torts resulting from
ministerial duties is well known to everyone.' In Banks v. City of Albany,
the plaintiff alleged that to obtain fire protection for his dwelling outside
defendant's corporate limits, he had registered with the Chief of the
Albany Fire Department and paid the annual fee of $IO as prescribed in
an ordinance; and that his residence was totally destroyed by fire due
to the negligence of the defendant and its employees in failing to extinguish
the fire. The defendant demurred saying that the maintenance of a fire department by the municipality is a governmental function. The court agreed,
reasoning that the fact that the protection was extended beyond the corporate limits and that a reasonable fee was charged for such service did
not change the operation of the fire department from a governmental
function to a ministerial one. The court followed the case of Mayor of
Savannah v. Lyons,' which held that the operation of an airport outside the
corporate limits was a governmental function, notwithstanding that fees
and revenue were received for the use of the flying field, when it did not
appear that the airport was operated primarily as a source of revenue.
The law requires a municipal corporation to exercise reasonable care
to make and keep its streets safe for all ordinary uses for which they
are open to the public, 4 based on the theory that this is a ministerial function.' In Hammock v. City Council of Augusta, the plaintiff alleged that
while walking on the sidewalk, a dead limb fell from a tree extending
overhead and struck her. The court reversed the judgment for the defendant on demurrer saying, that Georgia Code Section 69-303 is not
in derogation of the common law. Therefore, it should not be strictly
construed to include only defects in the surface of a street or sidewalk but
*Associate Professor of Law, Lamar School of Law, Emory University; B.S., 1941,
University of Georgia; LL.B., 1948, University of Virginia; Member American
and Georgia Bar Associations.
1. GA. CODE § 69-301 (1933); 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.23 (3d
2.
3.
4.
5.

ed. 1950).

83 Ga. App. 640, 64 S.E.2d 93 (1951).
54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936).
GA. CODE § 69-303 (1933); 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 54.02, 54.03

(3d ed. 1950).

Mayor of Savannah v. Jones, 149 Ga. 139, 99 S.E. 294 (1919) ; City of Barnesville
v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27, 197 S.E. 342 (1938), and cases there cited.
6. 83 Ga. App. 217, 63 S.E.2d 290 (1951).
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also include defects on the side of or above it. By alleging the city knew
of the condition of the limb or should have known about it by the exercise of ordinary care, the plaintiff stated a good cause of action against a
general demurrer. The same principle was applied again in City of Bain-,
bridge v. Cox,7 where the court, citing the Hammock case, stated that it is
a jury question as to whether the defendant's negligence brought about the
injury to the plaintiff, where the defect consisted of a rotten tree growing
between the sidewalk and the street and extending over the paved street.
In Glover v. City Council of Augusta, the plaintiff testified that she
alighted from an automobile and walked directly to a display window to
look at the objects therein. Still looking at the window, she moved down,
in response to a remark of her husband as to its contents, and instantly
fell over or upon the no-parking sign which had been placed directly under
the window. The directed verdict for the defendant was reversed on
appeal. The court said that in a suit against a municipality which is negligent
in keeping its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition, the
defendant can defend by proving that the pedestrian could nevertheless,
have avoided the consequences by using ordinary diligence on his part; and
also that it is incumbent on the plaintiff, as a matter of law, to use his
eyesight for the discovery of any such obstruction. Nevertheless, the pedestrian may still recover even where the obstruction is patent and there
are reasons why he did not see it,9 and even where he actually did see it,
if by looking the pedestrian would not have a full appreciation of the
,danger involved in using the sidewalk; nor is one bound to the same degree of care in discovering or apprehending danger in moments of stress
or excitement, or when the attention has been necessarily diverted as at
,other times. Whether the defendant was negligent in placing a no-parking
sign directly under a window especially decorated for the purpose of attracting and holding the attention of passers-by, and whether the plaintiff
used the diligence of an ordinary prudent person to apprehend the existence of such negligence, are both jury questions.
Rhodes v. Perlis"° held that where an injury is caused by the failure to
repair a defect in a sidewalk, the law places the duty to repair upon the
municipality, not the owner of property abutting such sidewalk; that
this is true even if this owner also owns the fee to a sidewalk used by the
public; and that the owner can only be held where he caused or actively
participated in causing the obstruction or defect.
The most interesting tort case of the past year as to municipal corporations was City of Atlanta v. Hurley:1 The plaintiff alleged that he was
a convict working on a street project, and that while digging in an
excavation on orders of the convict boss, an employee of the defendant,
the excavation caved in inflicting on him very serious injuries; that the
7. 83 Ga. App. 453, 64 S.E.2d 192 (1951).
8. 83 Ga. App. 314, 63 S.E.2d 422 (1951).
9. (Rope same color as street) Holliday v. Mayor of Athens, 10 Ga. App. 709, 74 S.E.
67 (1912); (darkness) Davis v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 143 Ga. 436, 85 S.E. 335

(1915).

10. 83 Ga. App. 312, 63 S.E.2d 457 (1951).
-11. 83 Ga. App. 879, 65 S.E.2d 44 (1951).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

cause of the cave-in was due to the negligence of the defendant. 2 The
demurrer to the petition was overruled and the defendant excepted. With
two judges expressing regret and one judge dissenting the court reversed
saying:
The general rule in this respect is that a municipal corporation is not liable
for injuries to prisoners or convicts resulting from the negligence of the keeper,
guard, pbliceman, or convict boss in charge of them, for the reason that, in the
maintenance of a jail and the working of convicts the municipality is exercising
governmental duties, and cannot be held responsible for the negligence or misconduct of officers which it must, of necessity, employ. 46 A.L.R. l00.13
of 4tlanta4 "is applicable to and

The court said the case of Nisbet v. City
controlling in the case at bar." In the Nisbet case the widow of a convict
sued alleging an injury to the husband's hand while working on the streets.
under the orders of a street foreman, which injury, due to the failure of the
defendant to provide any medical attention, resulted in his death; the
court affirmed defendant's demurrer on the ground that the municipality
was exercising governmental powers.
Judge Worrill agreed that the decision is correct under the authorities,
cited, but it is his opinion that the law "should be changed or modified."
Judge Townsend concurred specially saying that while the court cited many
decisions, they all, except for the Nisbet case, grew out of the governmental function of keeping prisoners, and that were it not for the Nisbet
decision he would dissent. He pointed out that at the time of the injury
the plaintiff was engaged in two functions; one governmental, that of:
keeping prisoners and administering penal affairs, and the other ministerial,
that of building streets. If he were not bound by the Nisbet case, he would
allow the plaintiff to recover on the theory that the city, at the time of his,
injury, was engaged in a ministerial function. Judge Felton dissented on
the ground that the dual phase (governmental and ministerial) wasn't
mentioned in the Nisbet case because that case went on the theory that the
inatteniton to the medical needs of the prisoner, not the injury while working on the streets, was the proximate cause of the death, and also that
the court in the Nisbet case cites a case 5 as being directly in point. The:ited case, however, dealt with an injury incurred inside a prison, whereas,
here the ministerial function was dominant and the governmental was
merely incidental; that the modern tendency is to restrict rather than exLend the doctrine of municipal immunity and "a majority of cases seem to
.iold that where the two functions are combined, it is impracticable to
;eparate them and that the rule as to private activities must be followed. 38
Akm. Jur. Section 6o8, p. 30S."
.2. "Failing to inspect and brace the walls and sides of the excavation where the
plaintiff was ordered and compelled to work, and where he was injured, and in
failing to use reasonable care and diligence in providing a safe place and working.
facilities where the plaintiff was ordered and compelled to work, and in failing to
give the plaintiff any warning of the dangerous condition of the excavation where
he was injured."

3. While not cited by the court, GA. CODE § 69-307 (1933). "A municipal corporation:
shall not be liable for the torts of policemen or other officers engaged in the dis-.
charge of the duties imposed on them by law."
4.
5.

97 Ga. 650, 25 S.E. 173 (1896).
Wilson v. Mayor of Macon, 88 Ga. 455, 14 S.E. 710 (1892).
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PUBLIC FINANCE

In Miller v. State," various residents, taxpayers, and water users of the
city filed interventions and demurrers to a petition seeking validation of
certain municipal water revenue certificates. The court reversed the overruling of these demurrers saying that it is implicit in the Act of 1937, as
amended," that the revenue certificates be issued to pay for a definite undertaking (as to improvements and the estimated cost thereof), that the
whole and reasonable details of which must be contemplated, chosen and
planned by the governing body of the municipality; that while it isn't necessary for the resolution to contain an intricate and detailed set of plans,
enough facts should appear to afford a key from which the full picture
of the project or improvement may be ascertained, such as, a reference
to reasonably specific plans, maps and specifications or their equivalent.
The reasons for this requirement are that the resolution and certificates
become a contract between the city and the certificate purchasers which
the latter can enforce by mandamus; and that the citizens of the municipality have the right to object to the validation of the certificates on the
grounds that the project is unreasonable, or unsound, and possibly others;
that unless a reasonable degree of definiteness is required in the ordinance,
the project may be carried out substantially different from the plan
originally contemplated; and that as this resolution only shows that the
money be borrowed to pay the cost of "making improvements and extension
to the waterworks plant and system," the intervenors' demurrer should
be In
sustained.
5
New v. State,"
and -Robinson v. State & Camden County,"
9
the court
affirmed the sustaining of the intervenors' demurrers to proceedings to
validate muincipal bonds, by saying in the former case that the ineligibility
of two of the managers of the election did not in and of itself vitiate the
election, and that in both cases the alleged irregularities were not sufficient to render the election void, in absence of any fraud or any evidence
that the election had not been fairly and honestly conducted, and in absence
of any evidence that the results of the election would have been different if
there had been full compliance with the law."
The legislature, in its last session, passed two bills amending the Revenue
Certificate Law of 1937.2" One bill22 authorizes state and local public
authorities having corporate powers which have been or may hereafter
be created by general, local or special act of the General Assembly, to
enjoy the benefits of and to operate under the Revenue Certificate Law of
1937 (as amended) in the same manner as counties, cities, towns and
school districts of the state. The other bill 2 provides for the authorization
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

83 Ga. App. 135, 62 S.E.2d 921 (1951).
GA. CODE ANN. § 87-816 (Supp. 1947).
83 Ga. App. 428, 63 S.E.2d 671 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 584, 61 S.E.2d 773 (1950).
GA. CODE § 34-3101 (1933).
Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 761-774, as amended, Ga. Laws 1939, pp. 362-366, Ga. Laws 1950,
pp. 188-189, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 87-802, 87-803 (Supp. 1947).
22. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 46.
23. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 455.
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of revenue-anticipation certificates for the purpose of refunding or refinancing in whole or in part all outstanding revenue-anticipation certificates and
general obligation bonds upon any given undertaking of any municipality.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

Some municipalities and counties in the State, of Georgia have employed
appraisal experts to revalue the property within their respective localities.
There has been some doubt as to the legality of such contracts. In Bagwell
v. Cash,24 the petitioners, as taxpayers, sought to enjoin the Commissioner
of Roads and Revenues and the Tax Assessors of Hall County from
carrying out a contract with a company, under which the latter was to
furnish experts to make estimates as to the valuation of property within
the county. The contract provided that the employees of the company
were not to act as tax assessors, but that all findings were to be used as
the tax assessors deemed best. The demurrer to the petition was overruled.
The court affirmed saying, that by law, the county boards of tax assessors
can only employ agents to seek out unreturned property;25 that the assessors cannot, with the approval of the county commissioners, obligate the
county to pay another, with county funds, for performing services which
the law26 requires the assessors to perform and for which they draw pay
from the county; nor is the public estopped by the acts of these officers
as the company had notice."7 Chief Justice Duckworth in his concurring
opinion stated that if the counties desire such services, they should seek
recourse to the legislature.
The court above pointed out Ga. Code, Chapter 92-69 applies only to
counties and not municipalities, thereby distinguishing the case of Tietjen v.
Mayor of Savannah," which held that the city was authorized under its
charter to make such a contract.
9 the court held that where the
But in Ezzard v. City of Lawrenceville,"
charter provided for the election of three city tax assessors, who are
to value and assess for taxes all property within the city, this negatives
any authority on the part of the mayor and council to employ anyone else
to do the same thing, and this is true even though another section of the
charter provides that the mayor and council have full power and authority
for the assessment, levying and collecting of ad valorem taxes, as this
latter provision must be construed in connection with the former which is
mandatory. The Tietjen case is distinguished in that, the charter of the
City of Savannah had no mandatory requirement that assessors be elected,
but that the right of the Mayor and Council of the City of Savannah to
elect assessors was discretionary under Ga. Code Section 92-400i.
Telford v. City of Gainesville"° held that the cooperation agreement between the City of Gainesville and the Housing Authority of the City of
Gainesville, whereby the former agrees to eliminate unsafe or insanitary
24. 207 Ga. 222, 60 S.E.2d 628 (1950).
25. GA. CODE § 92-6910 (1933).
26. GA. CODE § 92-6911 (1933).
27. GA. CODE § 89-903 (1933).

28. 161 Ga. 125, 129 S.E. 653 (1925).
29. 207 Ga. 649, 63 S.E.2d 657 (1951).
30. 208 Ga. 56, 65 S.E.2d 246 (1951).
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dwellings, "as approved by the P. H. A.," which equal in number the
newly constructed dwelling units provided by the project, should not be
construed as an attempt by the city to delegate to the P. H. A. nondelegable police power; but it should be construed to be only an assurance
from the city that it will, as it should, properly exercise that power for
the purpose of abating as public nuisances unsafe or insanitary
dwellings which should be eliminated by it in the interest of public
welfare.
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH STATE LAW
Reid v.
held that the well-established rule that a municipal
corporation cannot legislate on subjects already made offenses and punishable by the laws of the state is obviously not violated when a municipality
makes the mere act of possessing a lottery ticket or number, prima facie
evidence of the violation of an ordinance, because the state law3 only
makes the operation to a lottery or the selling, offering for sale, procuring
for or furnishing to any person a ticket in a lottery, a misdemeanor.
ORDINANCES

Perkerson"'

PUBLIC OFFICERS

While there is considerable conflict of opinion as to whether an officer
,or employee of a municipality has a vested right to a pension, a majority
of jurisdictions say that it is a bounty to be given or withheld by the
legislature and that it is no part of the contract of employment, even
where the employee contributes to the pension fund.33
In Bender v. Atnglin,4 a retired member of the Fire Department of
the City of Atlanta sued to recover the difference between the pension
($ioo per month) he was due under the pension fund set up under the
Acts of 1924 and I93I,"5 and the pension he was actually paid ($75 per
month) under an amendment in i935 ;6 while working, he was assessed

one percent of his monthly salary and later two percent, which was paid
into the pension fund. The demurrer to his petition was sustained. The
court, with two members dissenting, reversed the demurrer, holding that
while the general rule is that such a pension is a gratuity, not a contractual
obligation and may be terminated at the will of the grantor; that where
the employee's salary is'taxed, this is a contract" with consideration flowing
from both parties, giving him a vested right which cannot be impaired
under the Constitution of the United States" or the Constitution of
Georgia;" that if it were construed to be a gratuity, it is doubtful that this
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.

207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950).
GA. CODE §§ 26-6501, 26-6502 (1933).
3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.144 (3d ed. 1949).
207 Ga. 108, 60 S.E.2d 756 (1950).
Ga. Laws 1924, p. 167, as amended, Ga. Laws 1931, p. 223.
Ga. Laws 1935. 1. 450.
Trotzier v. McElroy, 182 Ga. 719, 186 S.E. 817 (1936) ; and West v. Anderson, 187
Ga. 587, 1 S.E.2d 671 (1939), also held that such a plan was a contract, but in these
cases the right to receive benefits in the pension fund had already accrued (retired)
prior to the amendment of 1935 reducing the amount. In the former case there was
dicta that this must occur for the petitioner to recover.
U. S. CONST., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
GA. CONST., Art. I, § 3, 1 2, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-302 (1948 Rev.).
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pension system could be sustained, since the State Constitution prohibits
the General Assembly from voting any such gratuity."
Where a county official fails to make bond as required by law, 4 such
county office will not be declared vacant, unless this failure is due to the
negligence or default of such officer; and the requirement that it be filed
on or before the first day of January next after the election42 should not
be strictly'construed 3 In Robert v. Stead." the court held that there is no
compliance with the law where one is elected county surveyor and fails to
file the bond for more than ten months after notice from the county ordinary that no bond was filed within the statutory time, and that this forfeiture is especially true where, due to this neglect and delay, another person is.
named to the office and qualifies by taking oath and giving bond as required by law.
The law45 establishing in each county a board of tax assessors consisting
of three members appointed by the county commissioners has been
amended" as to counties with a population of less than 25,000, in that
the number of tax assessors in these counties shall consist of not less than
three nor more than five. The number serving is to be determined by the
county commissioners or other county governing authority.
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS

Harbuck v. Richland Box Company47 held that while an ordinance cannot authorize and ratify the maintenance by a person of a permanent obstruction in a public street amounting to a public nuisance, it can, under
authority delegated by the legislature, abolish or close a street; and in so
doing, the interest of the public therein ceases, and the owners of the fee,
who are presumptively the abutting landowners, become entitled to use
the property without regard to the former servitude imposed upon it.
ZONING

Stokes,4"

In Ellis v.
it was alleged that the state statute" creating the Fulton Planning Commission required that on the submission of any amendment
to a zoning resolution by this commission, the Commissioners of Roads
and Revenues shall set a time (day and hour) for the hearing of the
proposed change and give notice to the public thereof; that this requirement
was not complied with as to the rezoning of the district in which the
petitioners own property, in that the notice did not specify the day and
hour of the hearing, nor did thirty days elapse between the date of the notice
and the date of the hearing as required by the zoning ordinance of the
40. GA.

CONST.,

Art. VII, § 1,1 2 (1), GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5402 (1948 Rev.).

41. GA. CODE c. 89-4 (1933).
42. GA. CODE § 89-501 (6) (1933).

43. Ross v. Williamson, 44 Ga. 501, (1871).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

207
GA.
Ga.
207
207
Ga.

Ga. 41, 60 S.E.2d 134 (1950).
CODE § 92-6903 (1933).
Laws 1951, p. 715.
Ga. 537, 63 S.E.2d 333 (1951).
Ga. 423, 61 S.E.2d 806 (1950).
Laws 1939, § 9, p. 584.
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county commissioners." In affirming the denial of a temporary injunction,
the court with three members dissenting,"' held that the notice given by
the commissioners of a hearing "at their regular meeting, at the Fulton
County Courthouse on Wednesday, July 2, 1947" was sufficient compliance
with the statute; that as the commissioners by law are to meet on the first
Wednesday in each month; and that July 2, 1947, being the first Wednesday
in July, the notice complied with the statute as to the day; that as the
statute only -requires constructive notice, the petitioners, having notice
of the day, had notice that the meeting would be held at the time of the
regular meeting of the commissioners on that day. Therefore, in the
absence of a showing that the meeting occurred at some time other than
at the time of their regular meeting, the notice also complied with the
statute as to the hour; that even if it be conceded that the notice did not
comply with the literal and technical terms of the statute, in the absence
of a showing that the failure resulted in harm or injury to the plaintiffs,
this is not sufficient under the facts of this case to overcome the presumption that the action of the commissioners was valid.
LICENSES

In Crzimniey v. State, 2 the defendant was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors after his license had been revoked. The evidence showed, that
the defendant had paid the sum of $Soo for the license to sell whiskey and
$ioo for the license to sell beer and wine, and that he had agree to pay
in addition a monthly tax based on five percent of his gross purchases of
whiskey, wine, and beer; that while the license was granted, it was later revoked, without a hearing, on his failure to pay this monthly tax. The court
reversed saying that a county or municipality can only charge an annual
license, payable in advance, for the sale of alcoholic beverages. 3 It has no
right under legislative authority to engage in the liquor business, or accept a
share of the profits from anyone so engaged; nor has it the right to levy a
tax on the sales of liquor. While the sale of liquor is a privilege and not a
right, and while a city or county, in the valid exercise of its police power,
may revoke a liquor license without a hearing or notice, the defendant's
license was not revoked in order to protect the welfare, health, or prosperity of the county's inhabitants, but it was revoked because of a breach
of contract. Therefore, that part of the agreement requiring the defendant
to pay a percentage of the gross purchases is void. The revocation by the
county without a hearing, not being in the exercise of its police power is
likewise void.
The law," which requires a dealer to obtain a license from the Com50. Court easily disposed of the second point by the familiar rule that: "Rules of
procedure passed by one legislative body are not binding upon a subsequent legislative body operating within the same jurisdiction. Courts ordinarily will not invalidate an ordinance enacted in disregard of parliamentary usage, provided the
enactment is made in the manner provided by statute." South Ga. Power Co. v.
Baumann, 169 Ga. 649 (2), 151 S.E. 513 (1929).
51. On the ground that the notice did not comply with the statute, thus making it a
denial of due process in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions.
52. 83 Ga. App. 459, 64 S.E.2d 380 (1951).
53. Ga. Laws 1937-38, pp. 103-113, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-1031, 58-1032 (Supp. 1947).
54. GA. CODE § 84-1702 (1933).
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missioner of Revenue prior to the holding of any jewelry auction, has
been amended" by adding that such dealer must in addition obtain a license
from the municipality wherein such auction is to be held, or if outside the
corporate limits of any municipality, then obtain such a license from the
county.
HOME RULE

Municipal home rule in its broadest meaning deals with the power of
local self-government. While home rule is generally recognized as sound
in principle, in practice there are advantages and disadvantages. The
advantages are that each community is free to choose the kind of local
government best suited for its needs, such responsibility would stimulate
the citizenry in community affairs, permit prompt action in dealing with
current municipal problems, relieve the state legislature of the details
of local government, and remove from the state legislature the temptation
to interfere with municipal affairs for reasons of partisan politics. The
disadvantages are that the populations of large cities are usually indifferent or apathetic to community affairs, it favors the rule of the oligarchy
or the boss, and the difficulty in differentiating between state and municipal
affairs under home rule."
Under authority of the Constitution,57 the 195i General Assembly of
Georgia enacted a statute58 known as the Municipal Home Rule Law,
which repeals the Act of I947"

and provides the opportunity for all

municipalities in the state to adopt municipal home rule. The original
charter for a municipality can only be granted by the General Assembly,
but once a municipality is incorporated, it may come under the provisions
of the Home Rule Law by electing a charter commission to write a new
charter or by voting to come under the act and retain its old charter.
New Charter.-Underthis method, the legislative body of the municipality may pass an ordinance to submit the question, "Shall a commission
be selected to frame a charter?" or thirty percent of the eligible voters
of the municipality may by petition request the submission of the same
question. At the same election, the members of the charter commission
are also elected. Each voter shall vote for not more than seven candidates,
and if the vote be in favor of framing a charter, the seven candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall constitute the charter commission.
This commission, within ninety days after its election, shall submit a charter
to the governing authority of the municipality. If the charter submitted is
approved in an election by the voters, then the municipality is subject
to the Home Rule Law. If the charter voted on is not approved, then it
is thought that the whole procedure must be repeated.
Old Charer.-Underthis method, the legislative body may submit the
question, "Shall this municipality come under the provisions of the
55. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 495. (The words "such dealer" in the first sentence were omitted
in copying the old section of the Code. It is doubtful if this error affects the provision in any way as the term "dealer" is used in other parts of the section.)
56. 1 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.93 (3d ed. 1949).
57. GA. CONST. Art. XV, § 1, I 1, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-8301 (1948 Rev.).
58. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 116.
59. Ga. Laws 1947, p. 118, GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1001 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
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Municipal Home Rule Law and retain its present charter with the right
to amend the same under terms of said act?" or thirty percent of the
eligible voters may petition for the submission of such question to the
eligible voters of the municipality. An election is then held.
Amendments.-Once a municipality is operating under the provisions of
the Home Rule Law, an amendment to its charter may be proposed by the
legislative body of the municipality or by petition of thirty percent of the
eligible voters and becomes part of the charter when approved by the
electorate. As the Home Rule Law is a general act, it would seem that
once a municipality comes under it, the charter could not be amended by
local legislation enacted by the General Assembly.
Alnnexation.-The annexation of territory must be voted upon in both
the territory to be annexed and the municipality in separate elections. The
former election shall be called by the ordinary of the county in which the
territory proposed to be *annexed lies,6" upon notice from the governing
authority of the municipality or upon receipt of a petition of thirty percent of the qualified voters in such territory." If there is both a county and
a separate or independent school system in the county from which the
territory is to be annexed, the written approval of a majority of the members of the county board of education must be attached to the petition.62
If the election in the territory to be annexed 63 is favorable, then an election
is held in the municipality. If this is also favorable,.4the territory immediately becomes part of the municipality. Annexation under this act
is prohibited as to any municipality with a population of more than 200,000
persons, whose boundaries extend into two or more counties.
Recall.-An election to recall a municipal official may be effected by a
petition of thirty percent of the eligible voters. A two-thirds vote of those
voting in the election is necessary to effect a recall. If the official is not
recalled, no recall election shall be held on such official for a period of one
year.
In all probability, the General Assembly in 1952 will find it necessary
to clarify certain aspects of the act, but already many municipalities have
adopted or are moving toward the adoption of home rule under the i95i
act.
60. If the territory to be annexed lies in more than one county, the ordinary of the
county in which the larger portion of such territory lies shall act.
61. Note this is of the voters of the territory to be annexed, not the voters within the
municipality.
62. No such approval is necessary where the annexation is called for in the notice by
the governing authority of the municipality.
63. Those eligible to vote include both qualified voters residing in such territory and
qualified voters who own property therein.

